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Abstract 
 
We predict that adoption of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) by multinational 
non-financial firms is inter-related with both firm hedge accounting policies and 
choices about whether to adopt US GAAP or IFRS (‘GAAP quality’). We 
hypothesize that sources of both market risk and idiosyncratic risk mitigate the ability 
of ERM-adopting firms to produce greater risk reduction. Therefore, we predict that 
sources of firm specific risk, such as pension risk, and hedge accounting policies, as 
well as GAAP quality, interact with ERM to affect incentives facing multinational 
firms to reduce their risk. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that firms adopting 
ERM experience a reduction in stock return volatility but only for the period 
following implementation. Our results also find that income smoothing; GAAP choice 
and geographical complexity mitigate the effect of ERM adoption on risk and return 
volatility for ERM-adopting firms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  
In response to the enactment and implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2004, 
as well as the financial crisis in 2007-2008, managing risk from a holistic perspective 
is becoming an increasingly major consideration for multinational corporations. 
However the implementation of new financial instruments and pension reporting 
standards both under US GAAP and international accounting standards means that 
firms are also conscious of the ameliorating influence of such risks on the ability of 
the firm to undertake ERM analysis.1 
Prior US-based studies of the financial sector (e.g. Hoyt et al., 2009, Eckles et al., 
2010) hypothesise that US insurance firms adopting ERM are likely to lower the 
marginal cost of adopting risk, which creates incentives for profit maximising firms to 
reduce total risk while increasing firm value. By combining the firm’s risks into a risk 
portfolio, an ERM –adopting firm is better able to recognise the benefits of natural 
hedging prioritise hedging activities towards the risk that most contribute to the total 
risk of the firm and optimise the evaluation and selection of available hedging 
instruments. Thus by so doing, ERM –adopting firms will realise a greater potential 
reduction in risk per dollar spent. This reduction in the marginal cost of managing risk 
                                                 
1
 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) both recognize the importance of risk management through requiring, since 2001, 
recognition of notional values, and since 2005, the recognition of hedged and trading-based financial 
instruments at fair value gains in the profit and loss, although ‘cash flow hedge’ gains or losses can still 
be charged direct to equity. Recently the IASB proposed enhancing existing standards IAS 39 with 
IFRS 9. However other sources of risk are not specifically regulated. The chairman of the IASB, Sir 
David Tweedie, recently proposed further amendments to enable firms to more easily class derivatives 
as hedges (Financial Times, 12/12/10). 
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is argued to incentivise firms to profit maximise and further reduce risk until the 
marginal cost of risk management equals the marginal benefits (Beasley et al., 2005).  
However other research questions the value-added benefits of ERM adoption. For 
instance, public financial resource allocations to capital constrained health care and 
social services. A number of papers have discussed the importance of risk 
management issues for organisational forms (e.g. Miller et al., 2008) or for business 
continuity management (Power, 2009). However, the impact of specific forms of risk, 
e.g. market and/or idiosyncratic risk on the financing, accountability and effective 
management control of organisations affected, has not attracted any attention from 
researchers studying ERM adoption. Further, to the extent that recent global moves 
towards global accredition of (non-accounting) ERM professionals highlights the 
deficiency of accounting professionals in managing overall enterprise risk, the role of 
accounting versus ERM professionals in managing the transition to ERM adoption 
where multinationals can choose to adopt either strict US GAAP versus relatively 
non-enforceable IFRS reporting environments becomes a crucial issue. 
Contrary to the results of prior research, we find that firms which adopt ERM 
experience a reduction in stock return volatility but only temporarily. Due to the costs 
and complexity of ERM option, we also find that, contrary to the results of prior 
research, that the reduction in return volatility of ERM adopting firms does not 
become stronger over time. Finally, we find that operating profits per unit of risk 
(RO/return volatility) increases post ERM adoption, but these effects do not persist. 
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This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, it adds to the 
findings of existing literature on ERM adoption, which has been to date entirely 
restricted to studying only financial firms. Of the limited evidence available, Hoyt and 
Liebenberg (2009) find a large valuation premium (as measured by Tobin’s Q) for 
ERM adopters, whereas Beasley et al. (2008) find insignificant negative 
announcement returns for ERM adoption. Eckles et al. (2010) find that, after adopting 
ERM, firm risk decreases and accounting performance increases for a given unit of 
risk. Therefore, their results complement the findings of Hoyt and Liebenberg (2009) 
which are based on market valuation of firm performance.2 This study adds to the 
literature exploring the role and impact of para-professionalism in organisations, by 
examining ERM adoption for a sample of large European and US multinational non-
financial firms.3 We also incorporate the effects of firms’ choice over GAAP quality, 
by controlling for their choice whether to adopt IFRS versus US GAAP in 
implementing relevant financial instruments reporting and measurement standards. 
We also identify and control for other sources of firm-wide risk, such as pension 
funding risk, and also specifically control for efforts by firms to explicitly manage 
operational risks by the usage of both hedged and unhedged sources of interest rate, 
commodity and foreign exchange risks.  
                                                 
2
 Other studies examine ERM adoption by reference to the appointment of a chief risk officer (e.g. 
Kleffner et al., 2003) or in terms of ‘goodness of fit’ with other firm characteristics (Gordon et al., 
2009). However these measures are problematic and therefore are not examined in this paper. We 
instead use the standard approach of prior studies in identifying ERM adoption through evidential 
analysis of keywords in annual reports. 
3
 Limiting our analysis to the largest US and European multinational firms also allows us to avoid the 
size and institutional ownership issues which dominate the findings of prior studies on ERM adoption 
(e.g. Beasley et al., 2005; Hoyt et al., 2009; Eckles et al., 2010). 
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Our results are generally supportive of our predictions and thereby significantly 
extend the findings of prior research. Specifically, we find that the choice of ERM 
adoption is related to firm risk, GAAP quality, hedging policy, derivatives usage and 
pension funding risk. Our results have a number of broader policy implications that 
support recent pressure from regulators, rating agencies and institutional investors on 
firms to adopt ERM.4 
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the 
institutional background and literature review. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 4 outlines the research design. Section 5 discusses the data and sample. 
Section 6 reports the results of empirical tests. Section 7 provides a conclusion.  
                                                 
4 S&P introduced ERM analysis into its global corporate credit rating process for non-financial 
companies starting 2008.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section comprises a brief overview of the major features of financial instruments 
and the relevant applicable accounting standards. A financial instrument is any 
contract that gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or 
equity instrument of another entity.5 The need for a specific standard on financial 
instruments such as derivatives arose from the apparent inadequacy of traditional 
accounting practices, which are founded on principles developed when the primary 
focus in accounting was on manufacturing, e.g. accruing costs to be matched with 
revenues. Financial instruments arise at the point of revenue realisation, i.e. the need 
to transform these inputs into cash or claims to cash. Enterprises can use derivatives 
either to monitor changes in market risk or for speculative or trading purposes. 
Presumably firms that adopt ERM will be more likely to do the latter. The demand for 
hedge accounting is also related to the recognition that the traditional realisation and 
cost-based measurement concepts are generally inadequate for the recognition and 
measurement of financial instruments.6  
Under International Financial Reporting Standards (hereinafter ‘IFRS’), the 
recognition and derecognising of financial assets and financial liabilities is addressed 
in IAS 39 – Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (IASB 2004), while 
the offset of financial assets and financial liabilities and presentational disclosures is 
addressed in IAS 32 – Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation (IASB 
                                                 
5
 IAS 32, Paragraph 11 
6
 ‘Recognition’ is the inclusion of financial instruments in financial statements. 
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2005).7 Further, IAS 32, IAS 39, and when applied, IFRS 7 (IASB 2006), apply to the 
financial instruments of all entities that are prepared in accord with IFRS. There are 
no exclusions from the presentation, recognition, measurement or even the disclosure 
requirements of these standards. However, insurance contracts are excluded. The 
standards identify a number of criteria for financial instruments to qualify as hedging 
instruments. The standards also set out a number of restrictive conditions and 
documentation requirements in order to justify the procedure. Finally, the standards 
discriminate between fair value and cash flow hedges and require separate 
classification of interest rate, currency and commodity and other hedging derivatives.  
Another major issue arises over the implementation of these standards and 
ERM adoption propensity by multinational corporations and their decision to list on 
various global stock exchanges. First, US-based corporations and those whose cross-
list in US stock markets are required to reconcile their accounts with those prepared in 
accordance with US GAAP (i.e. by submitting either a Form 10K (US domestic 
firms), or Form 20F (foreign firms) to the Securities and Exchange Commission). 
Thus these corporations are required to provide detailed disclosures in accordance 
with SFAS 133 and these are enforceable by registration and via the Sarbanes–Oxley 
                                                 
7
 IAS 32 has both presentation and disclosure issues. IFRS 7– Financial Instruments, issued in August 
2006, replaced the disclosure requirements of IAS 32, and requires entities to provide more 
comprehensive disclosures in their financial statements that enable users to evaluate both the 
significance of financial instruments for the entity’s financial position and performance, and the nature 
and extent of risks arising from financial instruments to which the entity is exposed during the 
accounting period and at the reporting date, and how the entity manages those risks. However, IFRS 7 
was not fully effective for annual periods commencing before 1 January 2007; therefore there is only 
limited scope within this project to study the impact of this standard on disclosure and derivative usage 
practices. A new standard intended to simply the requirements, IFRS 9, is not effective until 2013. 
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Act (s. 404) internal control enforcements. In contrast, multinational firms that cross-
list in non-US exchanges face considerably less stringent requirements. Multinationals 
based in the European Union (EU) are required to adopt IFRS as required by the 
European Commission (but with explicit carve-outs for hedge accounting); however, 
there is no uniform enforcement of these disclosures as they are subject to the 
disclosure-based regulatory monitoring by national securities regulators.8 Therefore 
an interesting issue addressed by this study is to examine to what extent ERM 
adoption practices  by multinationals is conditioned by market or firm-specific risk 
factors, after controlling for likely variations in the strength of regulation and 
enforcement between the US and EU. 
2.2. Literature Survey - derivative usage 
The existing literature suggests that risk management is the main motivation for the 
use of derivatives. Previous US survey-based research suggests that firms that face 
challenges to manage their firms’ exposure to various sources of market risk are more 
likely to use derivatives (e.g. Geczy et al. 1997, Haushalter 2000), while Guay (1999) 
suggests that firms experience significant volatility reduction after using derivatives. 
By contrast, Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) and Hentschel and Kothari (2001) find 
little evidence of any relationship between derivative use and firm risk. Huang et al. 
(2007) find that price exposure for a sample of UK firms for the period 2003–2005 is 
                                                 
8
 Multinationals based in non-US or non-EU environments are subject to even looser requirements.  
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lower for a sample of UK firms with derivatives. However, they also find that 
derivative usage does not increase firm risk.9 
Most recently, Zhang (2008) examines the effect of SFAS 133 on corporate risk 
management behaviour of US firms by hypothesising that the standard’s effect varies 
depending on the hedge effectiveness of the derivative instruments. New derivative 
users are identified and then are classed as either ‘effective hedgers’ (EH) or 
‘ineffective hedgers/speculators’ (IS) depending on whether their risk exposures 
increased or decreased relative to the ‘expected level’ after the initiation of the 
derivatives programme. He finds that risk exposures relating to interest rate, foreign 
currency rate and commodity price decrease significantly for IS firms but not for EH 
firms following the adoption of SFAS 133.  
However Zhang (2008) only studies new users of the standard and thus risk exposures 
may vary considerably cross-sectionally, depending on when the firm initiated the 
programme. Further, the study is based on a large sample, where most firms hold no 
more than one of the three types of risk exposure. By contrast, most multinational 
firms in our study have exposure to both interest rates and foreign currency 
derivatives. Further, in common with other studies, Zhang (2008) focuses only on 
hedged derivative usage, and ignores the broader corporate use of derivatives for 
speculative trading. Finally, in common with other studies reviewed above, Zhang 
                                                 
9
 Hentschel and Kothari (2001) attempt to control for industry effects by deflating all variables by an 
average of two SIC code industry averages. This procedure, however, assumes that firms with higher 
equity volatility have a higher incentive to hedge. As we find no evidence of any such relationship, and 
since our sample comprises firms that raise their equity in various capital markets which suffer from 
different implied volatilities, equity volatilities are not comparable and we do not adopt this procedure 
in this study.  
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(2008) does not examine the likely effect of idiosyncratic risk, pension risk and other 
industry and cultural effects on cross-sectional variation in derivative usage and firm 
choice of ERM strategy.  
In summary, the existing literature provides little insight into how the adoption of fair 
value oriented reporting of derivative exposure is related to non-financial firms’ 
strategic decisions to use derivative securities for risk management purposes and its 
consequences for cost of capital and shareholders’ wealth. While risk management is 
now a feature of many developed economies, perfect markets finance theory, upon 
which accounting standards are premised, provides little rationale for why 
multinational firms would seek to expend scarce resources to hedge unsystematic risk. 
However, the development of financial innovations in risk transfer means that various 
market imperfections can create opportunities for such firms to maximise market 
value through hedging. In fact, there is a range of value, cash flow and accounting 
rationales for risk management.  
The above discussion highlights the importance of the hedging versus non-hedging 
distinction in the context of the use of derivatives. However, the existence of hedge 
accounting highlights the limitations of the accounting framework in representing a 
firm’s underlying economic exposure. This is because the reported accounting 
exposure – based on exposure of fixed obligations to floating interest rates or foreign 
currency rates – may, for reasons associated with the application of fair value 
measurement principles, either understate or overstate the firm’s true underlying 
economic exposure.  
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Cornell and Landsman (2005) analyse various aspects of SFAS 133. They criticise 
SFAS 133 for classifying fair value hedges, changes of which are charged to income, 
separately from cash flow hedges, which are charged against comprehensive income. 
Shrand (1997) further identifies interest rate sensitivity as an important issue in 
analysing the impact of new accounting rules on financial instruments. The broader 
literature, which draws on accounting disclosure and measurement to explain firms’ 
risk management policies, has mainly sought to examine firms’ risk management 
policies through the analysis of ‘accounting quality’. Viewed from this perspective, 
firms attempt to manage earnings and their financial leverage by exercising 
managerial discretion over variations in GAAP application. The extent to which firms 
can exploit these factors is limited by the choices available under GAAP, audit quality, 
tax and enforcement, litigation by shareholders and enforcement of covenants by 
lenders. Since a firm’s decision to use derivatives that qualify for hedge accounting 
treatment involves discretion over the application of GAAP, one would need to 
control for other firm-specific factors, such as pensions and other idiosyncratic risks. 
In addition, it is likely that firms’ operating and financial activities are exposed to 
market-wide financial risk. The increasing globalisation and integration of product, 
insurance and financial markets highlights the increasing importance of the ability or 
inability of the firm to manage market or non-diversifiable risk, and their inability to 
do so is increasingly being exploited by powerful hedge funds and other speculative 
investors. However, until relatively recently, efforts by corporations to hedge against 
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the negative impact of these exposures on cash flows, earnings and capital structure 
by using derivatives were not even recognised in their balance sheets or performance.  
Further, previous empirical research has not examined whether the ability of firms to 
manage financial risks is systematically associated with their discretionary choices in 
managing accruals, reporting accounting exposures, and other firm, industry or 
cultural factors. Alternatively, it simply reflects the underlying economic exposures. 
To our knowledge, current literature on the impact of derivative usages is based on 
survey data, which may not be representative owing to the low response rates that are 
typical of such an approach. An important exception is the new study by Zhang 
(2008). In addition, existing literature normally examines the impact of financial 
instrument usage by comparing that for an individual country to usage in the US. In 
contrast, we use data for a broader sample of both US and European FTSE Global 500 
firms.  
Under the restrictive assumptions of a perfect capital market, Modigliani and Miller 
(1959) show that capital structure is irrelevant to a firm’s intrinsic value and the cost 
of capital. There is therefore little rationale for the firm to hedge these risks by using 
any derivative securities for fund raising or asset exposure.  
However, with market frictions, such as taxes and the cost of financial distress, 
there may be an optimal combination of different financial securities to finance the 
needed assets (Stulz 1985). While there is a trade-off between the benefit of a tax 
shield and the cost of bankruptcy when firms issue debt financing, interest rate risk 
still exists. For example, when the interest rate goes down, a firm can issue cheap debt. 
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The old debt represents an opportunity cost. Change in financial leverage implies 
change in the cost of capital. However, there is little empirical evidence for the cost of 
capital and firm risk effects associated with the usage of derivatives. Moreover, there 
is little or no evidence for an association between the propensity to adopt ERM and 
the incidence of derivative usage by firms and their exposure to other sources of 
idiosyncratic risk, such as pensions.  
Eckles et al. (2010) contrast the number of studies examining the determinants of 
corporate risk management policy, with the much fewer studies analyzing the 
valuation impact of risk management. Allayannis and Weston (2001) study the use of 
foreign currency derivatives for 720 non-financial US firms between 1990 and 1995. 
Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value, they find a positive relation between firm 
value and the use of foreign currency derivatives, with an average hedging premium 
of 4.87%. Carter et al. (2006) study the jet fuel hedging behaviour for US airline 
industry between 1992 and 2003. Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value, they find 
that the hedging premium could be as large as 10%. Further they find that the positive 
relation between hedging and firm value increases in capital investment, and most of 
the hedging premium is attributable to the interaction of hedging with investment, 
suggesting that the hedging benefit comes from a reduction of underinvestment costs. 
To summarise, the overall weight of empirical evidence supports the theory of 
corporate risk management. Firms’ optimise their risk management policy based on 
the cost benefit tradeoffs and consequently managing risk has a positive impact on 
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firm value. However there is little known inter-relation between firm ERM choice, 
derivative usage trends, and firm risk sources. 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
 
In this section, we briefly discuss the costs and benefits of hedging for a multinational 
firm. We then develop specific hypotheses concerning specific types of derivatives 
used to hedge foreign currency and interest rate risk, and their association with 
various sources of market, firm and institutional risk respectively. In order to explore 
these interactions, we distinguish between systematic risk and specific or 
idiosyncratic sources, for example, focusing in particular on leverage (for interest rate 
risk) and earnings from foreign operations (affecting the management of foreign 
currency risk). We focus specifically on relating these factors to the firm’s overall 
reported accounting exposure.10  
 
3.1. Costs and Benefits of ERM 
Derivatives have generally lowered the cost and increased the precision with which 
financial markets are able to unbundle and distribute both interest rate and foreign 
currency risk. There are various arguments for the use of hedging by firms. In 
particular various ‘market imperfections’ may create a solid case for corporate 
                                                 
10
 For the remainder of this report we focus only on the use of derivatives solely for hedging purposes. 
Therefore we do not seek to analyse the use of derivatives that do not qualify for hedge accounting 
treatment.  
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hedging. We consider a number of different arguments for risk management using 
ERM, each of which justifies our predictions in the following sections. Most of the 
existing theoretical  literature (e.g. Stulz 1985; Froot et al. 1993) does not directly 
discuss ERM, but instead has shown a number of ways in which hedging on corporate 
account can increase shareholder value. The substantial gains produced by hedging 
result from the fact that risk affects the expected cash flows that corporations can 
deliver to their shareholders because of taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy and other 
sources of market imperfections. For most of these, a shareholder’s hedging on their 
own account cannot reduce the firm’s financial distress or change its expected liability.  
The major reasons for using derivative securities are to manage first the exposure of 
assets and liabilities, and secondly of internal operating cash flows and operating 
income. Myers and Majluf (1984) develop a pecking order theory which suggests that 
firms find that raising external capital is relatively costly in the presence of 
transaction and incentive problems. Froot et al. (1993) extends this theory by arguing 
that the major reasons for using derivative securities are primarily related to incentive 
problems and information asymmetries between a firm’s managers and their external 
capital providers. Informational asymmetries arise because incentive problems within 
multinationals generate frictional costs that also make externally raised funds 
relatively costly. Froot et al. (1993) argues that corporate risk management 
programmes allow a multinational firm to use its cash flow more effectively by 
permitting it to shift the internal funds. 
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While the costs of implementing ERM and specific hedging instruments can be high 
for any firm, we believe that for multinational firms these costs are low relative to the 
benefits of reducing information asymmetries and for ameliorating incentive problems. 
An important attribute of high-reputation firms is their ability to maintain high levels 
of sustainable or high-quality earnings over time. Another important attribute is their 
ability or willingness to engage in hedging activities to mitigate risk. However, 
empirical research has not so far examined whether the ability of firms to manage 
financial risks through reducing their cost of equity or enhancing their performance is 
systematically associated with their discretionary choices over ERM adoption, or their 
relationship with reporting accounting exposures, other firm, industry or culture-
specific factors, or whether it is simply reflecting the underlying economic exposures. 
3.2. Hypotheses 
We now discuss hypotheses concerning the various testable empirical implications of 
incentive problems related to the association between risk taking, risk to reward ratios 
and ERM adoption incentives facing multinationals. It is likely that firms’ operating 
and financial activities are exposed to market-wide financial risk. The propensity to 
adopt ERM is therefore related to the ability or inability of the firm to manage market 
or non-diversifiable risk, and their inability to do so is increasingly being exploited by 
powerful hedge funds and other speculative investors. However, until relatively 
recently, efforts by multinational corporations to hedge against the deleterious impact 
of these risks on cash flows, earnings and capital structure by using derivatives that 
were previously not even recognised in their balance sheets or performance. In 
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developing our hypotheses below, we specifically control for cross-sectional variation 
in both market-related factors (book-to-market) as well as a number of firm-specific 
risk factors (e.g. firm complexity, financial leverage, pension risk). We also control 
for accounting quality and earnings volatility, since the concurrent implementation of 
IFRS and US GAAP over the period of the study required firms to be more 
transparent about the sources of pension funding and risk on their balance sheets. All 
these hypotheses include the assumption that all other factors are held constant. 
Propensity to adopt ERM 
Following Froot et al.’s (1993) arguments concerning the need to reduce incentive 
problems, we initially predict that the propensity of firms to adopt ERM is primarily 
related to the desire of multinational firm managers to better manage the exposure of 
their existing assets, liabilities and internal cash flows. To reduce incentive problems, 
increased usage of foreign currency derivatives can be beneficial for firms subject to 
idiosyncratic risk affecting their global operations. We posit a positive association 
between usage of derivatives and specific sources of firm risk. 
H1: The propensity of firms to adopt ERM is positively associated with firm risk. 
 
Changes in Firms’ Market Risk Exposure over time 
We also examine, for a given level of disclosure and usage, the propensity of firms to 
increase or decrease their ERM adoption over time. Zhang (2008) argues that changes 
in derivative usage following the implementation of new GAAP can help us to 
discriminate between cosmetic and cash flow rationales for hedging.  
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Following Zhang (2008), we first separate effective hedgers from ineffective hedgers 
by identifying the propensity of firms to either increase or reduce their use of risk 
management programmes over time. We further specify the relationship between the 
propensity to adopt ERM and firms’ total risk and their risk to reward ratio, 
respectively, is generally consistent with the prior arguments developed by Eckles et 
al. (2010), after controlling for regulatory and firm specific factors discussed above.  
H2. The propensity to adopt ERM is positively associated with a reduction in total 
risk.  
H3. The propensity to adopt ERM is positively associated with an increase in the risk 
to reward ratio.  
 
 
4. Research design 
 
Our research design follows the 2-stage Heckman procedure for evaluating ERM 
adoption, as developed in Eckles et al. (2010). Specifically, in order to test our first 
hypothesis (H1), we need to specify a model with firm’s risks as the dependent 
variable and ERM adoption and other controls that potentially influence firm’s risk as 
the independent variables: 
 
_ intercept _firm risk ERM adoption controlsγ β= + ∗ + ∗    (1) 
 
A finding of γ < 0 will be in support of H1. One potential concern in estimating (1) is 
the self-selection problem. To mitigate this form of omitted variable bias, we employ 
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the Heckman two-step procedure to estimate the impact of ERM adoption on firm 
risk.11  
 To predict the probability of ERM adoption, we control for firm size and 
operation complexity by using the log of total assets (size), the log of the number of 
overseas business operations (BUSSEG), and the percentage of foreign sales 
(FORS).12 We  include a lagged measure of firm risk, the log of annualized standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns over the previous three years (volt), to control for 
the potential relation that riskier firms have greater incentive to hedge (see e.g. Smith 
and Stulz (1985)). Since firm earnings is related to the demand for hedging, we also 
include a measure of covariation in firm earnings (COEARN).13 Finally, we also use a 
dummy for GAAP quality, for the sample of firms which are non-US and use IFRS 
(GAAP).14 
                                                 
11
 Following the procedure outlined in Eckles et al. (2010), we first use a probit model to estimate the 
probability of a firm adopting ERM to get the predicted probability for each firm (prob(ERM)). We 
then use this predicted probability (prob(ERM)) to compute the inverse Mills ratio (IMR), which is the 
probability density function of prob(ERM) over the cumulative probability density function of 
prob(ERM). In other words, the inverse Mills ratio captures the selection hazard. We then estimate (1) 
including the inverse Mills ratio in addition to other control variables. 
12
 Eckles et al. (2010) argue that the rationale for these control variables is that (a) the more complex 
and more myriad risks that a firm faces, the greater benefit a firm can realize by taking a portfolio 
approach to manage risk; (b) existing literature (see, e.g. Mian (1997)) finds that corporate demand for 
hedging activities are function of economic scale and operation complexity. 
13
 The relation of firm earnings and propensity to use derivatives is a controversial and unresolved 
issue. Allayannis and Weston (2001) argues that derivatives use can reduce the volatility earnings, 
although these findings are contradicted by Rowntree et al. (2009). Understanding this relation requires 
further specification of the earnings measure used and whether and in deriving a robust measure and 
scope of derivative usage is adopted. The relation of earnings to derivative usage and ERM adoption is 
therefore problematic and we make no specific prediction on this relation. 
14
 Our model is robust to alternative specifications. In unreported tests we also use the median OLS 
regression to address issues of extreme outliers. There are no significant differences in results. 
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The dependent variable in this Probit model is a dummy variable (ERM) that takes the 
value of one if a firm practices ERM in that year. Therefore, we have the following 
equation for the first-stage regression of the two-step Heckman procedure: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 ,
Probit( 1) intercepti t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
ERM size BUSSEG GAAPDUMMY
PENFUND VOLT DERIVDUMMY
β β β
β β β ε
= = + + + +
+ + +
(2.1) 
 
For the second stage, we estimate an OLS model of the following specification to 
investigate the impact of ERM adoption on firm risk: 
, 1 , 2 , , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,
9 , ,
intercept _i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t
volt size ERM firm IMR GAAPdummy
DERIVVAL BUSSEG MTB LEV COEARN
PFUND
β β β
β β β β β
β ε
= + + + +
+ + + + +
+ +
    (2.2) 
 
The dependent variable (volt) is the log of the annualized standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns. We choose stock return volatility as our proxy for firm risk, 
because it is a well established measure for a firm’s total risk. Mayers and Smith 
(1982) and Smith and Stulz (1985) show that, when capital markets are imperfect, 
firms care about total risk (as opposed to systematic or idiosyncratic risk). 
Stock return volatility is also preferred to other alternative measures of firm risk such 
as earnings or cash flow volatility, because stock price data are available on a daily 
basis whereas earnings and cash flow data are only reported quarterly. 
Following the approach suggested by Eckles et al. (2010), our primary 
variable of interest is the interaction term between a dummy that takes the value of 
one if a firm has ever adopted ERM during our sample period (ERM_firm) and a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm practices ERM that year (ERM-
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implem_dummy). Based on our H1, we expect 2β < 0. The dummy ERM_firm 
controls for any potential group fixed effects between firms that ever adopted ERM 
and firms that never adopted ERM during our sample period. For example, ERM 
firms may have a more flexible corporate culture than non-ERM firms, which allows 
them to more quickly learn and implement new technology. Supporting this argument, 
Kleffner et al. (2003) find that organizational inertia is a major deterrence preventing 
firms from adopting ERM. By including both ERM_firm and 
ERM_firm*ERM_implemen_dummy in the regression, we can then isolate the 
incremental impact of ERM adoption on firm risk. Adopting ERM is an endogenous 
decision made by a firm. Our estimation could be biased if ERM adoption coincides 
with the change in underlying firm characteristics that drive firm risk. We explicitly 
control for this potential omitted-variable bias by including the inverse Mills ratio 
(IMR) that we compute from (2.1). 
We also follow Eckles et al. (2010) by including in Eq (2.2) other variables that the 
existing literature predicts influence firm risk, such as firm size (the log of total assets, 
size), growth opportunities (the log of the market-to-book ratio of assets, MTB), firm 
leverage (long-term debt over total assets, debt). Larger firms and firms with a long 
trading history provide the market more information (Barry and Brown, 1985). Thus 
we expect those firms to be less volatile. We also measure leverage (LEV) based on 
the standard argument that debt acts as a lever, magnifying profits and losses, and thus, 
contributes to higher firm risk (Lev, 1974).  
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We also include two additional control variables which we consider to be 
pertinent to our analysis but which are not studied by prior research. First, we model 
firms’ notional or fair value exposure to interest rate and /or currency risk. This 
measure of firm risk is relevant in particular to the argument of Froot et al. (1993) that 
derivative usage by firms should be viewed from a broader functional perspective. 
These arguments imply that derivative usage is connected with sources of 
idiosyncratic or firm specific risk, rather from an institutional perspective, as codified 
by existing rules to narrowly focus on mitigating specific market risks. 
Second, we include specific potential sources of systematic and idiosyncratic 
risk that may affect the propensity to adopt ERM. Specifically, we include a measure 
of both the propensity to use derivatives (DERIVDUMMY), the notional or fair value 
of derivative usage (DERIVAL) and total pension fund risk, defined as the relation of 
market value of pension assets to accrued benefit obligation (PFUND). The corporate 
finance and accounting literature has previously treated pension funds as off-balance 
sheet debt, notwithstanding the recent requirement in FRS 17, SFAS 158 (US) and 
IAS 19 (IFRS) to require recognition of deficits or surpluses. However the differential 
treatment accorded to changes in value over time whereby firms can elect to use a 
corridor approach to amortise any shortfall under IAS 19 and US GAAP means that 
the full funding implications are only observed via footnotes. Coronado et al. (2008) 
argue that these are insufficient and that analysts regularly underprice pension 
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shortfalls. This is measured as the disclosed ratio of assets to liabilities, even though it 
is not reported in the financial statements.15  
Finally, an important explanation of ERM adoption is firm complexity 
(BUSSEG), which which is used by prior studies such as Eckles et al. (2010) in the 
second-stage regression to controls for the possibility that firms decide to change 
business mix or other activities in response to a change in firm risk due to ERM 
adoption. However BUSSEG is likely to be highly correlated with size.  Further, our 
study sample is restricted to the largest global multinationals, whose business 
complexity may be complicated by international diversification of business operations. 
Therefore, we replace the standard proxy (number of operating segments) with the 
number of geographic segments, to reflect the agency related costs of complexity 
arising from the demand for decentralisation of decision making control facing 
multinational firms. 
To test our second hypothesis (H2), following Eckles et al. (2010) we also modify 
equation (2) by adding time lags of ERM implementation (X denotes the vector of the 
control variables): 
1 1,0 , ,
1
intercept _ _ _
n
t i t i t
t
volt ERM firm ERM implemen lag Xκ λ ε
−
=
= + ∗ + +∑    (3) 
                                                 
15
 Prior to the issue of SFAS 158, US firms (under SFAS 87) were only required to recognize the 
underfunded net pension obligation. A corridor approach was used to minimize the impact of 
unexpected variations in pension risk. A similar approach is used under IAS 19 unde which firms could 
elect to spread pension costs based on the corridor approach. IAS 19 was amended in 2009 to restrict 
the corridor option. Neither SFAS 158 nor amended IAS 19, which removes this discretion, was 
effective during the study period. 
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To test our third hypothesis (H3), we also follow Eckles et al. (2010) by using 
equation (2), replacing volt with ROA/volt in the second stage of the equation.  
 
,
1 , 2 , , 3 ,
,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,
9 , ,
intercept _i t i t i t i t i t
i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t
ROA
size ERM firm IMR GAAPdummy
volt
DERIVVAL BUSSEG MTB LEV COEARN
PFUND
β β β
β β β β β
β ε
= + + + +
+ + + + +
+ +
   (4) 
 
For all our regressions, we control for firm-level clustering following Petersen (2009). 
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5. Sample Selection, data sources and sample description 
 
5.1. Sample selection and ERM identification 
 
We start our sample selection process with all publicly-traded companies in the S&P 
500 and Euro top 300. We focus on non-financial companies, which are publicly 
traded so we can utilise stock return data and more easily identify ERM 
implementation through public filings. After controlling for financial firms, non-
surviving firms and entries and withdrawals over the period 2005-2009, we identify 
60 European and 121 US-listed firms. We chose both European and US-listed firms to 
identify the impact of differences in GAAP treatment between IFRS and US GAAP, 
and regime enforcement. 
 Firms are not required to disclose information about ERM implementation. 
Therefore we follow the procedure suggested by Hoyt and Liebenberg (2009) and 
Eckles et al. (2010) to identify ERM adoption for the above mentioned 181 firms. 
Specifically, we searched the annual report using key words such as ‘Chief Risk 
Officer’, ‘Enterprise Risk Management’, ‘Enterprise Risk Officer’, ‘Strategic Risk 
Management, ‘Integrated Risk Management’, ‘Holistic Risk Management’ and 
‘Consolidated Risk Management’. Once we find a reference using any of those key 
words, we read the item to determine whether it documents an ERM adoption event. 
We record the year of publication of the annual report to first provide evidence of 
ERM adoption. Our search yields 59 unique firms that adopted ERM between 2005 
and 2009.  
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5.2. Data sources and variable description 
 
We collect financial data from COMPUSTAT, stock price data from CRSP and 
derivative reporting data from the annual report. 
 
5.3. Sample description 
 
Table 1 reports the number of total sample firms and the number of firms that adopt 
ERM year by year for the period 2005-2009. We chose 2005 as the start of our sample 
period (i.e. three years prior to the first ERM adoption event) to examine the impact 
of ERM adoption on firm risk over time. Although firms started to adopt ERM in the 
mid-2000s, this practice does not become widespread until 2009. By 2009, 35% of 
publicly traded non-financial firms had implemented ERM. 
 
Table 2 reports key operating characteristics for the sample firms. For more in-depth 
illustration, Table 3 partitions the sample by whether a firm implemented ERM 
between 2005 and 2009 (hereinafter ERM firms) or never adopted ERM within the 
same period (hereinafter non-ERM firms). Panel A reports the descriptive statistics 
partitioned by ERM practice (two-tailed t test compares the mean differences in the 
variables). We also partition the sample by whether a firm exhibits stock return 
volatility greater than the sample median. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics 
partitioned by firm risk. As panel A shows, ERM firms are generally less volatile, 
significantly larger, more diversified and levered. Thus, descriptive statistics confirm 
findings in prior studies that ERM firms could be systematically different from non-
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ERM firms, highlighting the importance of controlling for the group fixed effect in 
our empirical tests. As Panel B shows, less volatile firms are larger and more 
diversified. These relations between firm risk and other firm characteristics are 
consistent with the findings from the existing literature. 
Table 4 reports the correlations among variables. There are no significant positive or 
negative correlations, indicating serial correlation and covariation is not an issue. 
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6. Empirical results 
 
This section reports the results of multivariate logistic and OLS models that are used 
to test hypotheses 1 to 3. Because there is controversy over whether notional or fair 
values are most appropriate basis to quantify the effects of firm exposure to 
derivatives, all results are reported separately for derivative exposure measured at fair 
value (Panel A) or at notional value (Panel B).16 
6.1. Impact of the propensity to adopt ERM 
 
 Table 5 reports the logistic regression results of our first hypothesis that firms’ 
propensity to use ERM is related to size and various risk characteristics (i.e. equation 
2.1). Our results are generally consistent with these predictions. In particular, for both 
Panel A (fair value hedge) and Panel B (notional value hedge), we find that larger 
firms are more likely to adopt ERM. The dummy for number of international 
operations is positive and statistically significant. There is also a positive and 
statistically relation between ERM adoption and pension funding, suggesting that 
firms with less onerous net pension obligations are more likely to adopt ERM. The 
relation between ERM adoption and market risk (measured by fair value) are more 
equivocal, but are generally consistent with the prediction that ERM adoption is 
positively related to market risk but negatively related to idiosyncratic or non-
diversifiable sources of risk. 
 
                                                 
16
 Most statistics available on derivative usage by firms is stated in terms of notional values. The 
notional value does not represent necessarily the full exposure of the firm. While the FASB originally 
required firms to disclose the notional value of derivatives (SFAS 115) this was later dropped and 
replaced with a fair value disclosure (SFAS 133; IAS 39).  
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6.2. Factors influencing ERM adoption propensity 
  
Our second hypothesis posits that there is a positive and significant relation 
between firm risk (measured by the standard deviation of returns) and ERM adoption. 
Table 6 reports regression results for this prediction, as modelled by equation 3. 
Contrary to the predictions of H2, we find that ERM firm is positively, but 
insignificantly, related to firm risk, indicating that ERM firms increase risk post ERM 
adoption. Since our dependent variable is the log form of firm risk, the positive 
coefficient of 0.145 (for fair value hedge) and 0.130 (notional value hedge)  implies 
that on average ERM adopting firms increase risk by 13.5 and 12.2 percent, 
respectively. These results suggest that ERM adopters are systematically riskier than 
non-ERM firms, which is consistent with the results of our logistic regression results. 
The inverse Mills ratio also enters the regression with significance, suggesting that it 
is important to control for self-selection bias. Results on our other control variables, 
such as negative relation with covariation of earnings and with the number of foreign 
operations, are consistent with the existing literature. Firm risk is positively related to 
the notional value of derivatives (panel B), but there is no statistically positive relation 
between pension risk and firm total risk. 
6.2. The impact of ERM on firm risk over time 
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Table 7 reports the regression results from estimating (3). To test our third hypothesis 
H3, we estimate three model specifications using different time lags post ERM 
adoption. Consistent with H3, we find that the risk to reward ratio post ERM adoption 
increases over time. Specifically, based on Table 7, column 3, firms realise a 47.9 
percent (42.6 percent for Panel B, notional value derivatives) percent risk to reward 
ratio during the year ERM is implemented. (Year = 0). However, the risk to reward 
ratio increases significantly  by 50.9% (48.5 percent for panel B, notional value 
derivatives), two years after the firm adopts ERM. Therefore, our results are not 
supportive of the prediction that benefits from ERM adoption increase over time.  
Moreover, there is a significantly negative relation between GAAP quality and firm 
volatility, suggesting that the experience effects of ERM adoption differ as between 
EU and US firms. 
This argument could also apply to the effect of ERM adoption on profits scaled by 
risk. To investigate this lagged effect, we estimate a similar set of regressions as in 
Table 7 (results not reported). In this case, we use profit per unit of risk as the 
dependent variable and examine the impact of ERM adoption over various time 
lags.We find some evidence in support of a lagged effect.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we exploit new reporting rules concerning the disclosure by 
multinationals of their hedged derivatives value and pension funding data to further 
extend and clarify the findings by prior studies concerning ERM adoption by firms. 
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Specifically we extend the scope of analysis of prior studies concerning the relation of 
ERM adoption propensity and firm total risk and risk-reward ratios to multinational 
non-financial firms, by incorporating new measures of sources of both idiosyncratic 
risk (pension risk), variations in GAAP quality, derivative usage and firm complexity. 
This enables us to test hypotheses developed by prior researchers in the insurance 
field that the propensity to adopt ERM and the risk volatility (and risk to reward 
relationship) is generally negative (positive) for ERM adopters. We do not find 
evidence to support the premise that multinational firms adopting ERM are better able 
to recognise the benefits of natural hedging, prioritize hedging activities towards the 
risks that contribute most to the total risk of the firm, and optimize the evaluation and 
selection of available hedging instruments.  Instead, we find that the risk reduction 
benefits disappear over time and that the risk to reward benefits reduce over time. 
Therefore, our results to do not support the premise in financial firms that ERM 
adopting firms are able to produce a greater reduction of risk per dollar spent. 
Consequently, our results imply that multinational firms implementing ERM, firms 
are unable to sustain experience lower risk and higher profits, simultaneously.  Instead, 
consistent with our hypothesis, we find that firms adopting ERM do not experience a 
reduction in stock return volatility.  Return volatility for ERM-adopting firms increase 
over time. We also find that returns per unit of risk (ROA/return volatility) do not 
increase over time for firms adopting ERM. These results should be treated with 
caution at this point. In particular our results are conditioned on voluntary disclosure 
of notional values, while firms in different industries may experience different 
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earnings-age profiles of employees that may influence the reported pension funding 
ration. Subject to these limitations, we believe that our results support the premise that 
ERM adoption is no universal panacea to reduce risk and increase risk-return reward 
for non-financial firms. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
 
Filtered Firms No. of Firms in the Sample 
Starting Point   450 
Financial firms (123)  
Non-financial firms  327 
Firms with no required data (105)  
   Firms with insufficient criteria 40  
Final sample size   182 
   
Regional breakdown of the final sample:    
US 121  
EU 61  
   
Total  182 
Note: The sample consists of non-financial constituents of the FTSE Global 500 firms as of 31 
December 2006. Constituent firms had to have been included in the FTSE Global 500 index for at least 
five years. In addition, sample firms need to have all available financial, stock market and credit 
ratings data on Compustat Global Insight, DataStream and Ratings Direct, respectively, to qualify for 
inclusion in the analysis. Firms were also excluded from the sample if they did not meet the liquidity 
or positive earnings criteria required to exclude alternative tax or financial distress incentives for 
derivative usage. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of key operating variables for the sample firms. Panel A reports the 
descriptive statistics partitioned by whether a firm has ever implemented ERM between 2005 and 2009 (ERM 
firms) or otherwise non-ERM firms. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics partitioned by whether the sample 
firm exhibits stock return volatility greater than the sample median which is 17.45%  
Panel A: Whether firm has ever implemented ERM 
ERM firms N Mean Median Min Max Stdev 
Stock return volatility (%) 219 1.598 0.182 0.001 14.134 3.285 
Total assets (millions) 219 44723 34304 1000 292181 46745 
Market value of equity 219 66826 38520 1000 605106 81145 
# foreign operations 219 7.708 6 1 42 7.184 
% foreign sales 219 0.496 0.490 0 1.814 0.352 
LT debt over equity 219 0.352 0.334 0 2.322 0.295 
ROA 219 0.067 0.005 0 1.897 0.223 
Stock return % 219 0.327 0.015 -0.974 28.936 2.467 
Hedged  derivatives– notional 
value 219 6498 710 -12 307000 23093 
Hedged derivatives fair value 219 477 0 -3178 41044 3201 
Unhedged derivatives – notinoal 219 1213 0 0 50929 5299 
Unhedged derivatives – fair value 219 46 0 -10558 10821 1185 
       
       
Non-ERM firms N Mean Median Min Max Stdev 
Stock return volatility (%) 681 1.374 0.169 0.001 19.159 3.217 
Total assets (millions) 681 43331 29766 1000 269470 45205 
Market value of equity 681 52385 31126 1011 538510 59280 
# foreign operations 681 6.539 5 1 49 6.026 
% foreign sales 681 0.453 0.461 0 1.730 0.344 
LT debt over equity 681 0.394 0.349 0 2.578 0.311 
ROA 681 0.023 0 0 1.588 0.080 
Stock return % 681 0.133 0.062 -0.960 15.590 0.903 
Hedged  derivatives– notional 
value 
681 
5049 741 -11325 376267 18115 
Hedged derivatives fair value 681 197 0 -2983 13027 1023 
Unhedged derivatives – notional 681 1676 0 1245 346191 18017 
Unhedged derivatives – fair value 681 23 0 -665 2596 201 
 
 
     
Panel B: Partitioned by firm stock volatility 
Low volatility firms N Mean Median Min Max Stdev 
Stock return volatility (%) 450 0.061 0.054 0.001 0.175 0.046 
Total assets (millions) 450 56659 36403 1000 292181 56978 
Market value of equity 450 60329 34367 1000 605107 72772 
# foreign operations 450 0.548 0.575 0 1.814 0.376 
% foreign sales 450 0.391 0.355 0 2.322 0.300 
LT debt over equity 450 0.042 0.005 0 1.897 0.157 
ROA 450 0.145 0 -0.960 28.936 1.758 
Stock return % 450 0.548 0.575 0 1.814 0.376 
Hedged  derivatives– notional 
value 450 6645 1255 0 124129 14304 
Hedged derivatives fair value 450 205 0 -3189 16534 1401 
Unhedged derivatives – notional 450 2855 0 -1245 346191 22325 
Unhedged derivatives – fair value 450 49 0 -10588 10821 855 
       
       
High-volatility firms N Mean Median Min Max Stdev 
Stock return volatility (%) 450 2.802 0.357 0.176 18.437 4.077 
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Total assets (millions) 450 30632 25847 2440 253932 23864 
Market value of equity 450 51451 31853 1000 504240 57070 
# foreign operations 450 6.904 5 1 49 6.647 
% foreign sales 450 0.375 0.401 0 1.232 0.286 
LT debt over equity 450 0.376 0.341 0 2.578 0.316 
ROA 450 0.025 0 0 1.440 0.099 
Stock return % 450 0.214 0.086 -0.974 14.690 1.075 
Hedged  derivatives– notional 
value 450 4151 500 0 375267 23840 
Hedged derivatives fair value 450 324 0 -1559 41055 2154 
Unhedged derivatives – notional 450 255 0 -40 18315 1275 
Unhedged derivatives – fair value 450 8 0 -347 1599 103 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics: Univariate Analysis 
Panel A: ERM choice ERM firms Non-ERM firms Diff N Mean N Mean 
Annualised stock return volatility  219 1.598 681 1.374 -0.893 
Total assets (in millions) 219 44723 681 43331 -0.393 
Market  value of equity (millions) 219 66826 681 52385 -2.849 
FORS 219 7.71 681 6.54 -2.380a 
MTB 219 37.03 681 56.83 0.220 
LEV 219 0.35 681 0.40 1.754b 
ROA 219 0.07 681 0.03 -4.346a 
Stock return 213 0.33 660 0.13 -1.700c 
COVEARN 176 0.83 568 0.79 -2.310b 
PFUND 218 0.381 676 0.04 0.483 
Total value of Hedging  219 477.13 681 196.70 -1.992b 
 
PANEL B: Volatility of stock 
returns 
Low volatility  firms High volatility  firms Diff N Mean N Mean 
Annualised stock return volatility  450 0.06 450 2.79 -14.01a 
Total assets (in millions) 450 56730 450 30609 8.96a 
Market  value of equity (millions) 450 60403 450 51319 2.06a 
FORS 450 6.74 450 6.90 -0.37 
MTB 450 5.17 450 98.85 -1.21 
LEV 450 0.39 450 0.38 0.70 
ROA 450 0.04 450 0.02 2.03b 
Stock return 450 0.15 450 0.21 -0.70 
COVEARN 450 0.41 450 -0.15 1.38 
PFUND 450 0.76 450 0.85 -5.12a 
Total value of Hedging  450 206.5 450 323.3 -0.96 
 
PANEL C: GAAP quality IFRS firms US GAAP firms Diff N Mean N Mean 
Annualised stock return volatility  296 0.147 605 0.381 -8.49a 
Total assets (in millions) 296 71787 605 29840 14.37a 
Market  value of equity (millions) 296 61796 605 52922 1.91b 
FORS 296 51.7 605 7.62 -5.53a 
MTB 296 6.23 605 74.32 -0.83 
LEV 296 0.386 605 0.382 0.24 
ROA 296 0.02 605 0.04 -2.31b 
Stock return 270 0.147 604 0.195 -0.45 
COVEARN 295 0.425 600 -0.019 1.02 
PFUND 279 0.733 605 0.843 -6.43a 
Total value of Hedging  296 269.4 605 253.3 0.11 
 
 
Note: This table provides descriptive statistics on the independent variables for the pooled samples of US firms 
(Panel A) and EU firms (Panel B), relating to four fiscal years, 2005-2009. 
Variable definitions:  
 
SD = Standard deviation of firm stock returns, calculated daily over one year 
SIZE = Market value of equity of stock as at 31 December or total assets in millions at 31 December. 
MTB = Ratio of book value of common equity to market value of equity  
LEV = Leverage ratio, equals long term debt divided by long term debt plus common equity  
FORS = number of overseas identified operations 
COVEARN = coefficient of variation for EBIT over past 3 years. 
PFUND = Ratio of market value of firm’s sponsored defined benefit pension fund assets to projected benefit 
obligation 
TVH = fair value of hedged foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives 
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Table 4 
Correlations among Independent Variables 
PANEL A: ERM firms (Pooled 2005-2010: n = 218) 
Variable ROA Lev LnTA LnMTB lnBus LnSdy Pfund HedgeNL HedgeFV Coefop 
ROA 1          
Lev 0.289 1         
LnTA -0.038 0.259 1        
LnMTB 0.201 0.011 -0.309 1       
lnBus 0.080 -
0.015 
0.188 0.039 1      
LnSdy -0.090 -
0.018 
-0.040 0.011 -0.170 1     
Pfund 0.226 0.266 0.054 0.088 -0.100 0.094 1    
HedgeN 0.286 0.070 0.083 -0.083 -0.035 0.104 -0.008 1   
HedgeF 0.155 0.079 0.056 0.081 0.020 -0.015 0.095 0.030 1  
Coefop -0.004 -
0.072 
0.001 -0.073 -0.040 0.009 -0.063 0.010 -0.018 1 
PANEL B: Non-ERM  firms (Pooled 2005-2010: n = 681) 
Variable ROA Lev LnTA LnMTB lnBus LnSdy Pfund Coefop HedgeNL HedgeFV 
ROA 1          
Lev 0.210 1         
LnTA 0.005 0.127 1        
LnMTB 0.050 0.213 -0.250 1       
lnBus -0.025 -
0.152 
0.023 -0.026 1      
LnSdy -0.080 -
0.001 
-0.112 -0.023 -0.156 1     
Pfund 0.061 0.103 -0.134 0.161 0.002 0.008 1    
Coefop 0.011 0.010 -0.020 0.046 0.034 -0.084 0.028 1   
HedgeN -0.014 0.017 0.122 -0.040 -0.004 -0.006 -0.092 0.015 1  
HedgeF -0.008 0.053 0.036 0.044 0.126 -0.019 0.080 0.008 0.020 1 
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Table 5 
Logistic Regression of Decision to Use Derivatives: Breakdown by Type of Derivative 
PANEL A: Determinants of ERM adoption (fair values) 
 (FV Hedging only) (FV Hedging and Trading) 
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
SIZE 0.062 0.580 0.038 0.728 
TvH 0.399 0.030 0.349 0.320 
NoFors 0.404 0.001 0.419 0.001 
Ln(sdvolatility) 0.051 0.268 0.046 0.315 
GAAP quality 0.087 0.695 0.038 0.864 
Pfund 0.824 0.056 0.858 0.047 
PseudoR2 25.604 21.900 
Wald chi-squared  0.034 0.029 
PANEL B: Determinants of ERM adoption (notional values) 
 (Notional value - Hedging only) (Notional value Hedging & Not for Hedging) 
Variable 
 
Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
SIZE 0.062 0.575 0.043 0.698 
TvH 0.001 0.660 0.001 0.122 
NoFors 0.426 0.001 0.424 0.001 
Ln(sdvolatility) 0.045 0.323 0.037 0.418 
GAAP quality 0.002 0.992 0.041 0.848 
Pfund 0.942 0.030 0.978 0.025 
PseudoR2 3.097 25.482 
Wald chi-squared  0.031 0.034 
Note: This table reports the results of the logistic regressions used to test hypothesis 1 (model equation 2.1) which predicts that the propensity 
of firms to adopt ERM is related to firm risk and complexity, as well as various other firm-specific risk and financial characteristics. Panel A 
reports the regression where derivative exposure is measured at fair value; Panel B where derivative exposure is measured at notional value. 
All data is based on 900 firm yearly observations for the period 2005-2009 
GAAP quality = 1 if US GAAP, 0 if IFRS 
ERM = 1 if firm has ever adopted ERM, 0 otherwise 
SIZE = Market value of equity of stock as at 31 December  
BTM = Ratio of book value of common equity to market value of equity  
LEV = Leverage ratio, equals long term debt divided by long term debt plus common equity  
NOFORS = number of non-domestic sales centres 
PFUND = Ratio of market value of firm’s sponsored defined benefit pension fund assets to obligation 
TvH = total value of hedged transactions (either Fair value (Panel A) or notional value (Panel B)) 
 
 
Level of significance: 
* significant at the 0.1 level 
** significant at the 0.05 level 
*** significant at the 0.01 level 
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Table 6 
Determinants of volatility of stock return and impact of ERM and 
Derivatives Usage by Type of Derivative: OLS Regression 
PANEL A: fair values  
 (Hedging Only)  ( Unhedged Only) (Hedged and unhedged) 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
GAAP quality 1.566 0.001 1.564 0.001 1.566 0.001 
ERM firm 0.145 0.396 0.149 0.380 0.145 0.392 
SIZE 0.056 0.526 0.058 0.511 0.056 0.525 
Inverse mills ratio 0.519 0.019 0.520 0.019 0.520 0.119 
TvH 0.001 0.826 -0.001 0.735 0.006 0.859 
Nofors -0.071 0.001 -0.071 0.001 -0.071 0.001 
MTB -0.067 0.422 -0.065 0.443 -0.058 0.421 
Lev -0.078 0.745 -0.080 0.740 -0.077 0.749 
Covarearn -0.018 0.080 -0.018 0.080 -0.018 0.080 
Pension fund 0.119 0.715 0.124 0.703 0.119 0.714 
F-statistic 14.201 14.209 14.199 
Adj R2 0.152 0.152 0.152 
PANEL B: notional values 
 (Hedging Only)  (unhedged Only) (Hedged and unhedged 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
GAAP quality 1.693 0.001 1.564 0.001 1.594 0.001 
ERM firm 0.130 0.442 0.147 0.385 0.118 0.485 
SIZE 0.047 0.592 0.058 0.515 0.042 0.630 
InvMills ratio 0.059 0.018 0.523 0.018 0.515 0.020 
TvH 0.008 0.017 -0.004 0.916 0.006 0.014 
Nofors -0.07 0.001 -0.071 0.001 -0.070 0.001 
MTB -0.061 0.364 -0.067 0.427 -0.050 0.476 
Lev -0.088 0.713 -0.075 0.754 -0.084 0.724 
Covarearn -0.020 0.074 -0.018 0.080 -0.019 0.072 
Pfund 0.153 0.635 0.123 0.705 0.147 0.648 
F-statistic 14.883 14.196 14.925 
Adj R2 0.158 0.152 0.159 
Table Note: This table reports the results of second stage OLS regressions used to test hypothesis 2 (model 
equation 2.2) which predicts a positive association between the firm’s volatility of stock return and the 
lagged effect of ERM adoption, controlling for, and various other firm-specific risk and financial 
characteristics. Panel A reports the regression where derivative exposure is measured at fair value; Panel B 
where derivative exposure is measured at notional value. All data is based on 900 firm yearly observations 
for the period 2005-2009 
GAAP quality = 1 if US GAAP, 0 if IFRS 
ERM = 1 if firm has ever adopted ERM, 0 otherwise 
SIZE = Market value of equity of stock as at 31 December  
BTM = Ratio of book value of common equity to market value of equity  
LEV = Leverage ratio, equals long term debt divided by long term debt plus common equity  
NOFORS = number of non-domestic sales centres 
PFUND = Ratio of market value of firm’s sponsored defined benefit pension fund assets to obligation 
Covearn = coefficient of variation of earnings before interest and taxes over past five years 
InvMill = inverse mills ratio based on the predicted probability from the probit first stage regression 
 TvH = total value of hedged transactions (either Fair value (Panel A) or notional value (Panel B)) 
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Table 7 
Determinants of risk to reward ratio and impact of ERM and Derivatives 
Usage by Type of Derivative: OLS Regression 
PANEL A: fair values  
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
GAAP quality -2.202 0.001 -2.201 0.001 -2.269 0.001 
ERM firm 1.049 0.143 1.053 0.137 0.940 0.186 
Yr 1 implement 0.227 0.767     
Yr 2 implement   0.645 0.381   
Yr 3 implement     -1.126 0.146 
Size -0.218 0.555 -0.221 0.548 -0.185 0.614 
Inverse mills ratio -0.698 0.449 -0.700 0.448 -0.726 0.430 
TvH 0.001 0.151 0.001 0.217 0.001 0.169 
Nofors -0.045 0.361 -0.044 0.363 -0.031 0.522 
MTB 0.542 0.121 0.523 0.136 0.590 0.093 
Lev 1.095 0.274 1.102 0.270 1.120 0.262 
Covearn -0.002 0.955 -0.003 0.950 -0.002 0.961 
Pfund 2.398 0.077 2.303 0.090 2.755 0.046 
F-statistic 2.806 2.178 2.294 
Adj R2 0.035 0.035 0.021 
PANEL B: notional values 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Variable -2.157 0.002 -2.138 0.002 -2.203 0.001 
GAAP quality 1.042 0.145 1.016 0.150 0.919 0.194 
ERM firm 0.349 0.650     
Yr 1 implement   0.679 0.356   
Yr 2 implement     -0.999 0.193 
Yr 3 implement -0.244 0.510 -0.258 0.484 -0.224 0.544 
Size -0.639 0.488 -0.678 0.460 -0.594 0.450 
Inverse mills ratio 0.002 0.044 0.002 0.043 0.005 0.046 
TvH -0.035 0.475 -0.038 0.428 -0.027 0.575 
Nofors 0.592 0.090 0.579 0.098 0.643 0.057 
MTB 1.120 0.262 1.099 0.271 1.123 0.260 
Lev -0.004 0.923 -0.004 0.921 -0.004 0.932 
Covearn 2.616 0.053 2.498 0.064 2.923 0.034 
F-statistic 2.345 2.401 2.474 
Adj R2 0.021 0.022 0.023 
Table Note: This table reports the results of second stage OLS regressions used to test hypothesis 3 (model 
equation 4) which predicts a positive association between the firm’s risk-reward ratio and the lagged effect 
of ERM adoption, controlling for, and various other firm-specific risk and financial characteristics Panel A 
reports the regression where derivative exposure is measured at fair value; Panel B where derivative 
exposure is measured at notional value. All data is based on 900 firm yearly observations for the period 
2005-2009. 
GAAP quality = 1 if US GAAP, 0 if IFRS 
ERM = 1 if firm has ever adopted ERM, 0 otherwise 
Yr 1 implement = 1 if firm has adopted ERM in 2007 
Yr 2 implement = 1 if firm has adopted ERM in 2008, 0 otherwise 
Yr 3 implement = 1 if firm has adopted ERM in 2009, 0 otherwise 
SIZE = Market value of equity of stock as at 31 December  
BTM = Ratio of book value of common equity to market value of equity  
LEV = Leverage ratio, equals long term debt divided by long term debt plus common equity  
TvH = total value of hedged transactions (either Fair value (Panel A) or notional value (Panel B)) 
NOFORS = number of non-domestic sales centres 
PFUND = Ratio of market value of firm’s sponsored defined benefit pension fund assets to obligation 
Covearn = coefficient of variation of earnings before interest and taxes over past five years 
InvMill = inverse mills ratio based on the predicted probability from the probit first stage regression 
 
 
